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1. Introduction 
 
  This paper analyses some of the current problems emerging in the Baltic economies with 
special reference to Estonia and the agricultural sector. The prime objectives are to put forward 
suggestions for improving the agricultural investment, and to improve the marketing towards the 
modern international consumer. The major points covered are: 
1.National changes following the break from USSR in 1991.  
2.Re-orientation towards the European Union (EU) and international markets.  
3.Changes for long-run growth in the Estonian agricultural sector.  
4.Marketing, and training people to recognize and properly assess investment opportunities.  
  Estonia is a small country of 1.5 million people, with a per capita annual wage of 
approximately $2,100. Independence was restored in 1991 within the Baltic states, but the 
agricultural slowdown continued. Estonian agricultural production fell by 21% in 1992. However, 
the agricultural decline seems to have bottomed out. ii Estonian agricultural output has stabilized in 
1994, while a rise of 2% is forecasted for 1995 (Estonian Economics Ministry, 1995). Resources 
are scarce for many nascent firms. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are examples of economies in 
transition, undergoing upheavals and moving from a centrally-planned system to a market 
economy. 
  Much of the macroeconomic change has stemmed from a re-orientation away from the 
former Soviet market and a focus on export of goods to the Western markets. Lithuania' s exports 
to CIS countries decreased from 95% of total exports in 1991 to 60% in 1994 (Tamosiunas and 
Vilkas, 1995). The CIS share in Latvia' s total exports has decreased to 43% in 1994 (Karnite et 
al., 1995), while Estonia has made even more progress in re-orienting to western markets. In 1994,  
Russia only accounted for 23% of Estonia' s total exports (Lugus and Vitsur, 1995). This process 
of re-orientation is likely to gain in strength after the free trade association with the European 
Union (EU) came into effect as of January 1, 1995 and to the extent that more progress is made in 
the field of integration of the Baltic economies into the international markets.  
  The large fall in the agricultural production was partly because the Baltic area was 
somewhat of a "bread-basket", which provided much foodstuffs for the USSR. The break-up of the 
USSR, political instability, the fall in value of the ruble and the relatively new experience of 
exposure to world market competition, meant a huge loss in market share on the Russian market. 
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Consequently, it may be expected that investment within the agricultural sector tends to fall until 
the marginal returns are equal to those returns in other industries. Other sectors, such as banking 
and tourist-oriented services (retail sales, restaurants, catering, etc.) which benefit from proximity 
to Finland and Sweden have achieved high growth rates with consumer demand rising 200% during 
1993, in current prices (Hansabank, 1994). The amount of tourists to Estonia increased by 23% in 
1994, which represents a growing industrial sector. (Estonian Economics Ministry, 1995) 
 
2. Current Changes in Agricultural Practices 
 
  Much of the agricultural procedures used are older and more labor intensive than those 
deployed in Western Europe and the USA, and thus, less productive per worker. Part of the reason 
lies in the plummeting numbers of productive livestock on state farms in relation to a fairly 
constant number of employees (Hansabank, 1994). However, unit labor production costs in terms 
of foreign currencies in the Baltic agricultural sectors are relatively low, so some parity will have 
to be established. For example, a Baltic farm laborer earned $35 per month in 1992 (Estonian 
Economics Ministry, 1994). This wage was about 40% lower than the average and would be a 
discouragement to hiring the best-qualified workers in high-mobility labor markets. Even though 
Estonian average wages have doubled to about $180 per month in the year up to March 1995, the 
average gross agricultural wage was $106 in 1994. The wage differential serves against agricultural 
workers and still remains true throughout the Baltic states. Nonetheless, the general competitive 
condition of the agricultural sector has been good in terms of absolute lower cost of labor when 
compared with the rest of Western Europe. It should be noted, however, that Estonian agricultural 
prices exceed those in Latviaiii, Lithuania, Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia (Estonian Competition 
Board, 1994). 
  The loss of central price controls would have contributed towards Estonian prices being 
higher than in the less market-oriented economies. The removal of centrally-dictated price controls 
via Moscow enabled some private individuals to make adequate profit by selling direct in the 
marketplace. On the other hand, this loss of central control could help to increase output. This has 
been illustrated by China, that introduced a "responsibility system" to encourage higher agricultural 
production in 1978. This was a motivation system to encourage a rise in production above quotas, 
whereby individuals could sell the surplus in private markets. As a result, agricultural output in 
China rose 61% during 1978 to 1984 (McMillan et al., 1989). 
  The Baltic trend is towards smaller and private enterprises. Lithuania, for example, has 
seen an explosion in personal enterprises from 15,000 in 1992 to 27,000 in July 1993. Though the 
number of firms employing more than 100 employees shrunk from 3,500 in 1989 to 600 in 1993, 
smaller firms employing fewer than 100 staff grew from 350 to 39,000 (Lithuanian Ministry of 
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Economics, 1993). Governments (such as the Estonian) have decided that it would be better to 
convert many of the state-owned enterprises to private ones for various reasons: 
1.Political: to keep promises made in the ruling parties'  manifestos in order to appease voters and 
power groups. 
2.Economic: to convert all Soviet-style collective enterprises to make them more "manage-able". 
3.Personal efficiency: to introduce more individual motivation.  
4.Investment: to increase domestic and attract more foreign investment.  
Obviously, these reasons are not separate, but are over-lapping with each other in many cases. 
Estonia has privatized the bulk of its industry. By December 1994 Estonia had sold 192 firms or 
nearly 80% of the value of state assets earmarked for privatization (The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 1995a). For the overall privatization process, The World Bank has offered praise for the 
Estonian case, with 125 signed contracts worth $63.4 million of which 30-50% went to foreign 
investors (The World Bank Estonian Mission Report, 1994).  
 
3. Agricultural Privatization 
 
  One of the main problems facing the governments trying to privatize the agricultural 
enterprises is the difficulty in attracting buyers, especially because many Baltic private citizens 
have insufficient capital, or no access to capital. Another problem is when an enterprise would be 
divided during privatization, whether the subsequent owners would be able to maintain adequate 
economies of scale in production. Is there an optimal agricultural enterprise size for the new 
owners under privatization? 
  The pace of privatization is retarded partly by the slow legal process of transferring 
property rights from public hands. This process is slow because of the reliance upon restitution, 
and not compensation, for changing property ownership. This is natural given the low Estonian 
Government financial reserves, and its commitment to a balanced budget. Restitution does, 
however, introduce delays in privatization when attempting to hand back property to the rightful 
owners in a fair and just manner. The agricultural privatization in Estonia has been slower than in 
the industrial sectors. Few agricultural enterprises were privatized; most being small-sized meat or 
dairy product plants representing a small proportion of the total Estonian national agricultural 
production (Estonian Privatization Agency, 1994).  
  One view is that in a country (e.g., Estonia) with a ' market-friendly'  governmental policy 
and a fairly well-developed regulatory system, privatization is more economically beneficial and 
easier to perform than under other circumstances. Privatization of enterprises that produce 
tradables in competitive or potentially competitive sectors (such as industry, airlines, agriculture, 
and retail operations) require little more than adequate attention to transparency in the transaction 
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and the lifting of any inappropriate regulations or price controls. It is likely to yield solid and rapid 
economic benefits as long as there are not economy-wide distortions that hinder competition.  
  Potential foreign investors may not be buying Baltic agricultural enterprises because of 
possible reasons: 
1.Few agricultural auction sales put up in the first place.  
2.Anxiety over local ethnic unrest or relations with Russia.  
3.Language or cultural problems.  
4.Perceived excessively high price asked in some cases.  
5.Range and/or quality of enterprises offered may be considered low. 
6.Too constrained regulations or employment guarantees.  
7.Poor service from Baltic marketers during privatization.  
  Foreign analysis has also identified structural inefficiencies within the administration of the 
Baltic privatization process: "...harmful inter-agency competition, missed opportunities, poor or 
insufficiently analyzed transactions that might provoke a backlash against privatization" (The 
World Bank, 1994). The continuation of these foreign anxieties can only lead to further blockages 
in potential investment sources. Clearly, the availability of the products (enterprises for sale) has 
not been in any doubt. The next events in the market chain are towards value and satisfaction and 
then exchange and transaction. These sequenced tasks have to be fulfilled (Kotler, 1984). The role 
of marketers and capital markets must be the next link in the market chain, and their efficiency has 
to be assessed. 
 
4. Capital Formation 
 
  The problem of low Baltic fixed capital formation slows future Baltic agricultural 
long-term growth, because of the: 
1.low economic base and spare capital available; 
2.privatization laws are incomplete in protecting private property rights, which raises investment 
risk; 
3.state-owned enterprises generally have less work incentive and access to capital to carry out 
investment plans; 
4.banks are extremely risk-averse and take very short-term views; 
4.individual people have little collateral (no large private assets); 
5.agricultural entrepreneurs are inexperienced in running private enterprises and writing business 
plans for credit requests; 
6.poor international information and investment flows.  
  These problems also exist in many of the ex-USSR and lesser-developed states. One 
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tautological fallacy is that of a Catch-22 situation: a country cannot attract foreign capital because it 
is poor, and it is poor because it cannot attract foreign capital. More to the point, however, is how 
potential investors can be convinced to expect higher marginal return on their investments by 
investing in these agricultural enterprises. That is, how to convince them that they can expect 
higher profits, irrespective of whether a country is poor or rich. For those poorer countries with 
large agricultural sectors, the problem is partly within the previous circular logic. The crux of the 
fundamental problem is how to break out of this vicious circle.  
  The main solution has been to readjust efforts to other more profitable markets. For the 
Estonian case as an example, international communications and marketing skills need to be 
modernized to attract more customers for its produce and more foreign investors. It is essential that 
the Government should take the initiative in communicating the (Estonian) investment opportunities 
overseas. This has been done by the Estonian government, e.g. by publishing advertisements in 
foreign newspapers for forthcoming privatization auctions. Such a market move is evident in the 
national drive towards privatization.  
  The Baltic target is to open up the foreign markets by removing tariffs and quotas. For the 
Baltics, their free trade association with the European Union - as of January 1, 1995 - is key to 
increasing the free-flow of goods for Baltic agricultural exports. This is coupled with timely export 
of these goods meeting Western quality standards, while maintaining competitive prices. 
Moreover, the association agreements with the European Union that the Baltics signed on June 12, 
1995 add a political dimension and set forth the prospect of European Union membership at a later 
date. iv This membership is particularly significant since the Baltics'  key trading partners Finland 
and Sweden joined the European Union on January 1, 1995.  
  Agricultural enterprises usually will not have the international contacts or advanced 
management skills to seize the international market opportunities. Utilizing resources to gain 
competitive advantage within the market is important for long-term business prosperity (Porter, 
1980). Baltic wages and regulations are very low compared with Western European levels; this is 
an area for competitive advantage. Balanced against this advantage are the disadvantages of 
unfavorable management attitudes/skills or lack of capital to change production patterns. Estonian 
prices do not necessarily give it an advantage within the Baltic area (Estonian Competition Board, 
1994). 
  The fundamental alternatives (Porter, 1980) are to: 
1.lower costs within the market (Baltics are not a big market); 
2.differentiate/change the product range offered; 
3.focus more on the Western markets; 
4.leave the agricultural sector (not likely to be politically acceptable given local unemployment 
conditions). 
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  One of the "fixes" chosen by the Baltic countries has been a program of investment in 
farming machinery, which has resulted in an increased flow of imports. Estonian imports of 
machinery and capital equipment went up as percentage of total imports from 17.7% in 1993, to 
19.4% in 1994. This is forecast for above 20% in 1995. The majority of the trade gap lies in the 
import of capital goods and machinery; but some of this capital investment holds hopes for the 
rejuvenation of the Estonian agricultural sector.  
  The problem of the projected trade deficit of $450m in 1995 (The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 1995b) for Estonia cannot be reversed in the short-run by a turnaround of the agricultural 
sector itself. But agriculture holds promise as one of the sectors that can break from the legacy of 
the past and emerge as a competitive and efficient local industry. Any suitable long-term strategy 
would be probably to stay out of agricultural basic foodstuffs and concentrate on national 
comparative advantage, e.g., processed value-added foods. This would be more positively income 
elastic, but may not be politically acceptable.  
  Many Baltic firms have low capital bases and poor international connections, especially in 
the agricultural sector. So Baltic groups (Governments and Chambers of Commerce) have to 
contact the institutions in the West to gain international market share and foreign investment. Thus, 
Estonia' s exports to neighboring Finland shot up form 2.3% in 1991 to 21.1% in 1992 and reached 
a relative plateau at 18% in 1994. Its trade deficit with Finland is large as imports are twice as 
large as exports. Finland remains Estonia' s largest and nearest Western European trading partner. 
This presumes some market access without excessive hindrances of quotas, tariffs or other barriers 
to trade. These have to be negotiated by the representative governments.  
  Applications for long-term credit and technical assistance from international financial 
bodies such as the EU, GATT, The World Bank and the IMF can only be done from the central 
national level. Some of the international investment will be spent in portfolio or direct investment 
as purchase of Baltic agricultural enterprises. Some spending will go on infrastructure 
modernization, such as staff training and international liaison, and operational technology, e.g., 
modern telecommunications and computer databases to raise capital and capture more foreign 
agricultural market shares.  
 
5. Areas for Proposed Agricultural Improvements 
 
  There are areas where improvements can be made to benefit the agricultural sector. Such 
changes represent a network of interrelated and connected parts that can be represented in a Value 
Chain (Porter, 1980). It is not to say that the marginal return from improvements will be the same 
in all areas, but each of these areas represent a part of the economy that directly influence 
performance in other connected parts. Some of the amendments proposed in certain areas are 
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essentially long-term in nature. The complete benefit is therefore viewed as the sum total of all the 
value-added improvements. 
 
Privatization 
  Some of the solution for the problem of declining agricultural investment and sales lies in 
privatization. This assumes that the private property rights are adequately defined, and housing can 
be released as loan collateral to secure additional investment funds for local agricultural 
entrepreneurs. As already stated in section 3, the speed of the privatization process is generally 
slow, but that seems to be symptomatic of the transition economies and problems of property rights 
whilst serving equity and efficiency. The filing of many claims on the property for restitution to 
"proper" owners will slow the privatization process. The optimum selling-off process itself has to 
be determined, as well as the medium of transfer (vouchers, shares or cash) and the target 
recipients (e.g., the whole nation or workers within the enterprise).  
  One view of privatization prefers a more "hands-off" Governmental approach, involving 
less central intervention, with enterprises sold "as is" ideally for cash. Small and medium-size 
competitive state-owned enterprises that can be sold through competitive bidding should be sold "as 
is", at the best price possible and as quickly as possible. The costs of delay are high, including 
potential deterioration of assets, loss of investor interest, and opportunity for opposition to 
coalesce. 
 
Government 
  New laws and Governmental policies are needed to enforce the moves towards 
properly-managed private agricultural enterprises. Definition and protection of private property 
rights are prime requirements within this area; adequate management skills are another 
prerequisite. An obstacle to securing a bright agricultural future investment is the lack of a 
completely developed economic infrastructure, particularly transport and communications.  Road, 
railways and seaports have to be upgraded.  The Baltic States'  renovation of Muuga (Estonia), 
Ventspils (Latvia) and Klaipeda (Lithuania) ports are large and long-term capital projects that 
require central management and finance, with a large element of Government initiative and 
international financial support. 
 
Financial Sector 
  The Government and Central Bank authorities could inject more money into the economy 
through the creation of more private property as collateral. If this money supply increase geared 
towards uses to increase domestic production investment, the growth rate of GDP would 
accelerate. On the other hand, where a large portion of the additional capital injection is lost to the 
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domestic economy as an international leakage on imported consumer goods or services, promoting 
domestic investment will be harder to achieve.  
  State agricultural banks exist in the Baltics, such as Lithuania' s, but transfer of state funds 
to the new private farm enterprises has sometimes been a problem. Much of the flow of capital to 
the private agricultural sector cannot occur successfully without adequate training of central bank 
staff. Investment risks have to be properly analyzed, and strong controls on the emission of state 
funds are needed to prevent significant losses through fraud or incompetence.  
  Private banks similarly have a role to play and could support suitable loan applications 
within the private agricultural sector. As has been mentioned, the privatization process allows the 
freeing up of collateral for use in gaining credit. Training of staff to assess agricultural business 
plans and credit risk fairly will be required in order to encourage enterprise. Significant moves 
away from short-term sure investment turnarounds, towards longer-term investment in domestic 
agricultural investment opportunities are needed to expand the Baltic economies.  
 
Environment 
  One of the main casualties is likely to be the natural environment itself, as unregulated and 
uninformed production methods may lead to major ecological damage. Uncontrolled production 
processes can easily lead to a market breakdown as the externalities of damage to public goods 
(land, air, water) are not properly accounted. Some of the cost are in the form of damage to 
farmland and the nature from excessive nitrogen levels. One study in the central Baltic stated: "The 
main sources of nitrogen are the instantaneous leakage of nitrogen from drained mires and farmers'  
application of nitrogen fertilizer and manure" (Gren, 1992).  
 
Education 
  Education will be necessary to promote the efficient use of the new capital and resources, 
and this requires initiative and long-term vision from the state. The running, and longer-term 
planning, of the newly-privatized agricultural enterprises require training and experience that may 
not necessarily be commensurate with past experience in collective enterprises. Modern production 
techniques have to be utilized in order to raise productivity. Private entrepreneurs have also to 
identify investment opportunities within the international market; this will require greater 
communication skills, and a drive towards establishing wider market contacts.  
 
6. Marketing in a Changing World 
 
  It has long been proposed (Ansoff, 1957) that there are four basic strategies for wider 
marketing: 
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1.Market penetration. 
2.Market development. 
3.Product development. 
4.Diversification. 
Given the present availability of human and natural resources, new market development seems to 
be the more rational choice. Developing a new agricultural foodstuff range for the Baltic market is 
one option, but with its current lack of effective buying power, foreign markets would seem more 
advantageous. One of the basic challenges facing a country that is primarily concerned with 
developing its economy is that of marketing. As emphasized in the preceding section, work skills 
have to be developed, training of advanced agricultural production techniques, management and 
marketing skills are essential if this sector is to expand. Planning skills in isolation are useless 
unless they are put into practice, i.e., a plan is worthless unless it degenerates into work (Drucker, 
1973). Courses in fundamental resource management and financial services skills are essential for 
needed resources and capital to flow. 
  The change from the old view of minimizing costs and risk, to promoting investment and 
increased wealth, will be part of a slow Gestalt-type shift in the mentality of the agricultural and 
financial communities. One view is that many of the new Baltic managers in the urban enterprises 
are generally young and more receptive to modern management techniques. This is often the case 
in Estonian banks and financial services, and is shown in the youth of the Estonian political 
leadership.v Agricultural managers in rural areas would often be likely to be less attuned to 
advanced management practices either because of age or poor access to local agricultural training 
colleges. How to reach these key people to disseminate needed management and marketing skills 
will continue to be a major problem. 
  Given the commitment to privatization, the submission and writing of business plans for 
marketing strategies will be essential. Their proper recognition as attractive business propositions 
from private enterprises is a major requirement. Marketing, and primarily training of people to 
recognize and properly assess investment opportunities, will be a key factor (Kotler, 1984). 
Entrepreneurship is an essential skill, and marketing knowledge has to be cultivated to a more 
international view if the agricultural sector is to develop successfully. 
  The upgrading of agricultural produce to meet international standards and tastes will be 
required. This is so with the basic staple food and agricultural products, which have low income 
elasticity of demand and face many substitutes from other competing countries. One possible view 
is to look at basic foodstuffs within an appropriate product-life cycle. Goods such as cabbage, 
potatoes and carrots have to be re-assessed as investment areas once they have reached a demand 
plateau. Such traditional goods may have been faced with declining demand in a stagnating market 
- an example of a "dog" product (Hedley, 1977).  
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  This will be another example of targeting the market according to "focus" (Porter, 1980). 
A vital opportunity lies for economies wishing to target "niche markets" where there is escalating 
demand. Other goods and markets, which have higher and increasing international demand, should 
be selected and attacked. Products having a positive income elastic demand should be considered.  
 
.7. Summary and Conclusions 
 
  The Baltic states move towards private enterprise, while their agricultural economic 
structure faces significant upheavals. Within these nations in transition, and in similar countries in 
economic crises, will come opportunities. The attraction of foreign interest, investment and skills, 
will create new market opportunities. Renewed investment is essential for raising the performance 
of the agricultural sector; training new production and management skills is part of this investment. 
Finding different products, making new contacts in growing markets, and targeting different 
customers will be inevitable.  
  A stronger economic base, built on increased domestic capital formation, will raise 
productivity. Training and education are primary parts of this social investment which will be 
required to raise agricultural growth and economic growth in general. The development would be a 
value-chain of connected activities that would still be led by the central authorities, in the spheres 
of education, legislature, finance and logistics (with international assistance where necessary). 
International financial and technical assistance will necessary at the appropriate areas and stages. 
Thus, the Government and its agencies continue to have a critical role in aiding agricultural 
development. Such leadership would be helped by a clear development strategy that defines 
concerted action, and not destructive rivalry between related governmental economic agencies.  
  The macroeconomic improvements have to be founded on an essential long-term 
development vision and plan of the economic infrastructure. It would then be likely that the Baltic 
economies and their agricultural sectors in particular can re-align themselves successfully to 
achieve focus in the international markets. It is hoped that some proposals within Estonia can be of 
help when applied to other regions. For the problems dealt with in this paper are not unique to 
Estonia and the Baltic States, but exist in many of the Central European and ex-USSR states. 
 
NOTES 
  
i.Yen Yee Chong was a Visiting Professor at Tallinn Technical University at the time of writing 
this paper. M. Peter van der Hoek is an Associate Professor of Economics at Erasmus Public Law 
and Economics Center (EPLEC), Erasmus University Rotterdam.  
  
  
 
  11 
  
ii.According to The Economist Intelligence Unit (1995b) agriculture and forestry accounted for 
approximately 10% of GDP in Estonia (1993), 10% in Latvia (1994) and 26% in Lithuania (1992). 
The latter number, however, is out of date due to dramatic changes in recent years. In 1994 
agriculture accounted for only 7% of Lithuania' s GDP (Tamosiunas and Vilkas, 1995).  
iii.The Estonian Competition Board' s statistics indicate that Latvian agricultural prices - like 
Estonian prices - exceed those in other parts of the region. Statistics provided by the Estonian 
Ministry of Agriculture, however, show that Latvian agricultural prices as of June 1, 1995 are 
surprisingly low. 
iv.Before the association agreements can come into effect they must be ratified by all 15 European 
Union members and the three Baltic parliaments.  
v.When the Laar government took office, the Prime Minister was 32 years old, while several cabinet 
ministers were younger than 30 years.  
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